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Abstract 
 
High levels of false recognition for non-presented items typically occur following 
exposure to lists of associated words. These false recognition effects can be reduced by 
making the studied items more distinctive by the presentation of pictures during 
encoding. One explanation of this is that during recognition, participants expect or 
attempt to retrieve distinctive pictorial information in an attempt to evaluate the study 
status of the test item. If this involves the retrieval and use of visual imagery, then 
interfering with imagery processing should reduce the effectiveness of pictorial 
information in false memory reduction. In the current experiment, visual-imagery 
processing was disrupted at retrieval by the use of dynamic visual noise (DVN). It was 
found that effects of DVN dissociated true from false memory. Memory for studied 
words was not influenced by the presence of an interfering noise field. However, false 
memory was increased  and the effects of picture-induced distinctiveness was eliminated. 
DVN also increased false recollection and remember responses to unstudied items.       
 
Keywords 
False memory 
Dynamic visual noise 
Visual-imagery 
Distinctiveness 
Episodic memory 
 
Distinctiveness Effects in False Memory & Dynamic Visual Noise                3 
 
Reduced Effects of Pictorial Distinctiveness on False Memory Following Dynamic 
Visual Noise.  
False memory refers to memory for events or experiences that have not occurred. 
Although this phenomenon has been studied in the laboratory by the use of a number of 
procedures, the one of concern in the research presented here is based upon the Deese-
Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Use of this 
method involves the presentation of a list of words, all of which are associated to an 
unstudied critical lure. For example, in a list comprising of the words thread, pin, eye, 
sew and sharp, the critical lure is needle. The typical finding is that subjects falsely recall 
or recognize the critical lure at rates approaching or sometimes even surpassing true 
memory for studied words (e.g., Gallo, Roediger & McDermott, 2001; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995; Thapar & McDermott, 2001).  
Use of this technique has found false memory effects to be particularly robust 
even when participants are warned about the nature of the false memory effect (e.g., 
McCabe & Smith, 2002; McDermott & Roediger, 1998). In addition, it has also been 
found that the memory illusion is often accompanied by the subjective recollection of 
actually studying the critical lure when using the remember/know paradigm (Norman & 
Schacter, 1997; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Seamon et al., 2002).     
Explanations for DRM false memory effects have taken a number of forms; the 
most successful being the activation-monitoring and gist processing accounts (e.g., Gallo, 
2010). From these perspectives, false memories arise as a function of particular processes 
occurring during encoding and retrieval. In relation to encoding, the reason false 
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memories arise in the DRM paradigm is because of the strength of association between 
the critical lure and the list words (Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001), and 
the overlap of semantic features amongst the list words (Brainerd & Renya, 2005). As a 
result, the activation of the critical lure takes place and processing of the semantic gist of 
the words is emphasised beyond that of more distinctive item-specific information. 
During testing, the retrieval of associative or gist-based information, typically leads to 
false memory of the critical lures. 
The accounts presented above suggest that if the processing of item-specific 
information were to be enhanced in some manner, then a reduction in false memory 
should be observed. One way to achieve this is through the presentation of pictorial 
information during encoding. By using pictures to accompany each word on the list, 
additional item-specific information would then be available for processing and, 
presumably, a reduction in false memory would result. Israel and Schacter (1997) 
assessed this idea by providing one group of subjects with a list of semantically 
associated words with corresponding line drawings. Another group were exposed to the 
same words, but in the absence of the drawings.  A subsequent recognition test revealed 
that false memory for auditorily presented critical lures was reduced in the picture 
encoding condition
1
.  
Further research has extended these findings. For example, Schacter, Israel, and 
Racine, (1999), found that older adults, like younger participants, were able to make use 
of pictorial encoding to reduce false recognition. It has also been found that pictorial 
encoding reduces false recognition to a greater extent when manipulated as a between 
(vs. within) subject manipulation (Schacter, Cendan, Dodson, & Clifford, 2001).  In 
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addition, Schacter, et al., (2001) found that altering the test conditions, so as to reduce the 
importance of retrieving item-specific information, attenuated the effects of pictorial 
distinctiveness. Similar effects to those observed with DRM lists have also been found in 
other paradigms such as the repetition-lag paradigm (Budson et al., 2005; Dodson & 
Schacter, 2002).   
From a cognitive perspective, it is important to consider how pictorial 
distinctiveness effects arise in order to reduce false recognition. One explanation is based 
upon metacognitive monitoring processes that come into operation during retrieval 
following the encoding of picture information. Generally, false memories can be reduced 
by the effective application of retrieval monitoring processes (Gallo, 2010; Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). More recently, Gallo and Lampinen, (2015) identified 
three types of such monitoring referred to as orientation, evaluation and corroboration. 
Orientation denotes the use of different retrieval strategies in order to query memory 
about a possible event. Evaluation refers to the use of expectations about the 
characteristics of what would constitute a likely memory. In some previous research, this 
has been called diagnostic monitoring (Gallo, 2010). Corroboration specifies the use of 
additional secondary information in order to decide on the validity of a memory. 
Previously this has also been called disqualifying monitoring (Gallo, 2010). In relation to 
the use of pictorial information, the role of retrieval evaluation or diagnostic monitoring 
is important (Gallo, 2010; Gallo & Lampinen, 2015).  
A specific example of the use of retrieval evaluation is the distinctiveness 
heuristic (Israel & Schacter, 1997; Schacter et al., 1999). The reasoning supporting the 
role of this in false memory reduction is as follows. Firstly, following the encoding of 
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distinctive information (such as pictures), participants develop the expectation that they 
should recall distinctive representations during the memory test. Those exposed to 
pictures during encoding, are hypothesised to demand access to distinctive pictorial 
information during retrieval in order to support decisions to the test items. Secondly, 
when distinctive information is not retrieved, participants are more likely to claim that the 
item was unstudied. Use of this heuristic is able to reduce false memory for critical lures 
because the critical lures, being unstudied, have not been associated with pictorial 
information during encoding. Participants exposed to words only, are not as likely to 
demand access to distinctive information and thus false alarms to critical lures arise as a 
result.   
Although this explanation claims that participants are expected to recall 
distinctive representations during retrieval, it is not clear what type or types of 
information are actually recalled. Presumably, following the study of pictures, then the 
recall of visual-imagistic representations is both expected and used by participants to 
reduce false memory. However, whether actual visual-imagistic representations are 
actually retrieved or used is not certain.  
One way to assess the extent to which visual or imagistic information is used is 
through the use of a task that interferes selectively with visual-imagery processing; an 
example is the dynamic visual noise task (DVN) (Quinn and McConnell, 1996). This 
involves the presentation of a visual noise field that comprises a display of an array of 
small black and white squares on a computer monitor. The squares change between black 
and white on a random basis over the presentation period and in many respects is similar 
to observing an out of tune TV monitor. Quinn and McConnell (1996) demonstrate DVN 
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disrupts selectively the processing of imagistic representations without disrupting other 
components of memory. For example they show that DVN produces memory 
impairments under conditions of visual mnemonic processing, but no effect under non-
visual rote rehearsal instructions (Quinn & McConnell, 1996).  
Later research has indicated that the magnitude of interference was directly 
related to the complexity of the DVN display (McConnell & Quinn, 2000; 2004) and that 
DVN impaired memory during encoding or retrieval, but not when used during the 
retention interval (Quinn & McConnell, 2006. Importantly, these effects were found only 
when participants were asked to use a visual mnemonic technique to memorise the 
information.  More recently, DVN has been shown to interfere with storage processes in 
memory when the information to be retained is not easily recoded into non-visual 
elements (Dean, Dewhurst, & Whittaker, 2008). Also, it has been demonstrated that DVN 
interferes with the recall and recognition of visual color information but not spatial 
location (Dent, 2009), recognition confidence (Kemps & Andrade, 2012) and the recall 
and recognition of high (vs. low) imagery words (Parker & Dagnall, 2009). Finally, 
interference effects have been found in other image generation tasks. In particular, Dean, 
Dewhurst, Morris, and Whittaker (2005) found that a DVN display interfered with the 
formation of mental images when participants were asked to make size comparisons 
between the names of animals presented verbally (e.g., is a whale larger than a lion?). 
However, DVN did not influence performance on non-imagery based tasks.   
These interference effects can be explained by assuming that DVN influences 
activity in a form of visual short-term memory that has been variously labelled as a 
passive visual store (Quinn & McConnell, 1996) or visual buffer (Kosslyn, Thompson & 
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Ganis, 2006; Quinn & McConnell, 2006). In particular, DVN gains access to this store 
and disrupts the generation, or manipulation of visual representations currently 
undergoing on-line processing (Quinn & McConnell, 2006). This notion of a visual 
buffer can be differentiated from other components of a visuospatial working memory 
system. For example, Logie (1995; 2011) describes a model of visuospatial working 
memory that comprises a number of processing components. One of these is the visual 
cache that functions as a visual short-term store that is able to maintain the outputs of 
visual perception or information retrieved from a long-term knowledge base. Information 
within the cache can be refreshed through a rehearsal mechanism called the inner scribe. 
Both of these components are separate from other components such as the visual buffer, 
and from other functions like visual mental imagery and visual perception. Rather, they 
function to hold and maintain visual and imagery based information in short-term 
storage. The nature of the representations held by the visual cache are of a more abstract 
nature compared to those of the visual buffer and are not considered visual mental images 
as such. In this model, visual mental images can be generated from the long-term store, 
and executive functions are then able to operate upon this as dictated by relevant task 
demands or processing goals (Logie & Van der Meulen, 2009).   
The results reviewed above appear to indicate the DVN task to be a good method 
for producing selective interference in the processing of visual-imagistic information.  
More specifically, when imagistic representations are generated during a memory task, 
then the presence of DVN should be able to disrupt the formation or use of these 
representations and impair responding. Consequently, the DVN task may provide an ideal 
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method for examining the contribution of imagery-based processes in false memory 
reduction.  
 In the current experiment, participants were exposed to a set of semantically 
associated words in the presence or absence of pictures. Later, they undertook an auditory 
recognition task in the presence of either dynamic visual noise or a static visual noise 
control. The items on the recognition task comprised of studied words, unstudied 
semantically related critical lures or unstudied unrelated lures. Participants were asked to 
indicate if they recognised the word and also to provide remember/know responses in 
order to assess recollective experience (Tulving, 1985). If imagery based processes play a 
role in false memory reduction during the retrieval of words following picture encoding, 
then it is predicted that with the presence of DVN, imagistic processing will be disrupted 
and participants will not be able to generate or use visual information in order to reduce 
false memory. Demonstration of this will provide evidence for the use of visual-imagistic 
processing during retrieval and its importance in false memory reduction.    
   
Method 
Design 
The experiment had two between-subject independent variables. The first was the 
encoding condition and had two levels: word only condition and word plus picture 
condition. The second was the presence of visual noise during retrieval and had two 
levels: dynamic visual noise and static visual noise.   
The dependent variables were the hit rate to studied words, the false alarm rate to 
critical lures of the studied lists, the false alarm rate to words from nonstudied lists, and 
Distinctiveness Effects in False Memory & Dynamic Visual Noise                10 
the false alarm rate to critical lures from nonstudied lists. In experiments using DRM 
stimuli, it is typical to differentiate between list items and critical lures. Furthermore, this 
differentiation is done for both presented and non-presented lists. For the most part, 
responses to list words and critical lures from non-presented lists do not differ (as neither 
were presented). However, incorporation of both types of item on a recognition test, 
creates a more “balanced” design and it enables items of equivalent status to be used in 
analyses that involve composite discrimination scores like d’. In the latter, it provides a 
basis for computing a score in which the hit and false alarm rates are calculated from 
similar items (e.g., critical lures or list words). This is outlined further in the results. 
Each of the responses to the item types outlined above were further analyzed in 
terms of remember, know and guess responses. In addition, the “raw” remember and 
know responses were converted into process-based estimates of recollection and 
familiarity (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995; Yonelinas et al., 1998). Finally, the signal 
detection measures of d’ and response bias (β) were calculated for both true and false 
memory. 
 
Participants 
A total of 80 individuals took part in the experiment. These were recruited from 
the student population of Manchester Metropolitan University and took part on a 
voluntary basis.  
 
Materials & Apparatus. 
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Twenty lists of words and pictures were taken from Israel and Schacter (1997) 
who adapted stimuli derived from Russell and Jenkins (1954) and Roediger and 
McDermott (1995). These lists were constructed by selecting the 12 word stimuli from 
each list that could be most readily depicted in pictorial form. The pictures themselves 
consisted of black and white line drawings of objects (e.g., a picture of a coin for the 
word “coin”) or concepts related to the word (e.g., a stack of logs for the word “wood”). 
For the present experiment each of the lists comprised of the 12 words together with a 
picture depicting that word. In addition, each list had an associated critical lure that itself 
comprised of both a word and a picture. The 20 lists were divided into two sets of 10 lists 
for the purpose of counterbalancing. Participants were exposed only to one of the sets, 
whilst the other set served to create unrelated distracters on the recognition test.  
 The recognition test was created by taking the first and seventh words from the 
presented set to serve as studied items (20 words). These were randomly intermixed with 
the word comprising the critical lure for each of the presented lists (10 words), the first 
and seventh words from the unstudied lists (20 words), and the critical lures from the 
unstudied lists (10 words). This created a recognition test of 60 words in total. Within the 
test booklet itself, the words were presented on the left together with the response options 
of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ to the right. Aligned with these response options were the words 
‘remember’, ‘know’ and ‘guess’. As the test was auditory, only the experimenter viewed 
the test booklet.  
  The DVN task was adapted from Quinn & McConnell (1996) and 
consisted of a display of 120 X 120 black and white dots (squares) each measuring 3 mm 
by 3 mm. In the static noise condition, the ratio of white to black dots was 50:50 and the 
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distribution was random across the display. In the dynamic noise condition, the dots 
changed from black to white and vice versa in a random manner every 0.25 s. As in the 
static condition, a ratio of white to black dots of 50:50 was maintained. Also, following 
the procedure of Dean et al., (2005) the percentage of dots changing was set to 50%. This 
represented a change rate of 7200 dots every 0.25 s. The overall appearance of the DVN 
field was of a gentle random flickering pattern.   
 A computer was used to present the stimuli during the encoding phase and the 
noise fields during the retrieval phase. 
 
Procedure. 
All participants were tested individually. During the encoding phase, participants 
were informed that they were to be presented with 10 lists of stimuli and they should 
concentrate upon these in preparation for a subsequent test of memory. In both encoding 
conditions, all the words from each list were presented before the next list. In the word 
only encoding condition, the items were presented one at a time in decreasing order of 
associative strength to the critical lure. Each word appeared in the centre of the screen for 
2 s with a 1 s interstimulus interval. In the words plus pictures encoding condition, each 
word together with its corresponding picture appeared side by side on the screen for 2 s 
with a 1 s interstimulus interval. Pilot research has shown that these timing parameters 
were sufficient to encode both words and pictures. The words appeared in 48-point Arial 
font and the pictures were all black and white line drawings whose size varied from 
approximately 3.5 by 3.5 cm to 8 cm by 8 cm. 
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 Following the presentation of the final list of words, participants were given a 
distractor task and asked to write down the names of as many U.K. towns and cities that 
they could generate in 3 minutes.   
 In the retrieval phase, participants were informed that the experimenter was going 
to read aloud a list of sixty words. For each word the participant was asked to say either 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ to indicate recognition of the word. If the participant responded ‘no’ the 
experimenter moved onto the next word. If a ‘yes’ response was made, the experimenter 
asked the participant for a ‘remember’, ‘know’ or ‘guess’ response before moving onto 
the next word.  
The remember-know instructions were adapted from Gardiner and Richardson-
Klavehn (2000). A remember response was defined as one which leads to conscious 
recollection of the study episode. A know response was defined as one in which the item 
is recognised because it seems familiar in the context of the experiment but which lacks 
associated recollective details. A guess response was defined as a yes response to a word 
that is neither associated with recollection or familiarity.    
Participants were also informed that during the auditory recognition test, they 
would be asked to look at a screen displaying the static (vs. dynamic) visual noise 
pattern. They were told that they should look at the noise pattern throughout the whole of 
the test. Compliance with these instructions was monitored by the experimenter. Once 
participants indicated that they had understood the instructions, they were asked to look 
at either the static or dynamic noise field and the test began.  
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Results  
 
All results were analysed by 2 (encoding condition: word only vs. word + picture) 
between-subjects by 2 (noise condition: static vs. dynamic) between-subjects ANOVAs. 
Effect sizes for ANOVA’s are reported as partial eta squared p
Effect sizes for simple 
main effects are reported as Cohen’s d. Where the follow-up tests (simple main effects) 
resulted in p values greater than .05, subsequent analyses were conducted in order to 
estimate the Bayes factor (BF). The BF provides an index of the extent to which the 
empirical data provide support for one hypothesis (e.g., the experimental hypothesis) 
compared to another hypothesis (e.g., the null hypothesis). In the calculations presented 
here, the posterior odds in favor of the experimental hypothesis were used as the 
numerator with the posterior odds for the null hypothesis as the denominator. 
Consequently, a BF of less than 0.3 provides substantial evidence for the null hypothesis, 
one over 3.0 provides substantial evidence in favor of the experimental hypothesis. Bayes 
factors in between these values is relative evidence of an inconclusive result, the 
weighting in either direction depends upon the closeness of the value to either 0.3 or 3.0 
(Dienes , 2011, 2014).  
Overall recognition. Yes responses to the proportion hit rate (together with false 
alarm rate and signal detection measures) can be seen in Table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
This revealed no effect of encoding condition, F(1, 76) = 1.76, p = .19, p

 = .02, 
noise condition, F(1, 76) = 2.34, p = .14, p

 = .03, or interaction, F(1, 76) = 0.17, p = 
Distinctiveness Effects in False Memory & Dynamic Visual Noise                15 
.68, p

 = .002. The same was true of d’, F(1, 76) = 0.63, p = .43, p

 = .008, for 
encoding condition, F(1, 76) = 0.007, p = .93, p

 = < . 001, for noise condition and F(1, 
76) = 0.04, p = .84, p

 = .001, for the interaction. Analyses of response bias (β)3 revealed 
a significant effect of noise condition F(1, 76) = 4.16, p = .04, p

 = .05, indicating a 
more liberal response bias in the presence of DVN. The effects of encoding condition and 
the interaction were not significant; F(1, 76) = 1.50, p = .22, p

 = .02, and F(1, 76) = 
0.005, p = .94, p

= < .001 respectively.  
Analyses of the yes response to critical lures produced a significant effect of 
encoding condition F(1, 76) = 14.10, p ≤  .001, p

 = .16, indicating greater false memory 
in the absence of pictures. The main effect of noise was also significant F(1, 76) = 8.44, p 
=  .005, p

 = .10, showing more false memories in the presence of DVN. Importantly, 
the interaction was also significant, F(1, 76) = 5.99, p =  .01, p

 = .07. Observation of 
the means suggested DVN reduced the typical distinctiveness effect in the picture 
encoding condition. This was confirmed by analysis of simple main effects at each level 
of noise condition. In the SVN condition, the presence of picture reduced the proportion 
of false memories (t(38) = -3.92,  p ≤  .001, Cohen’s d = 1.23), replicating previous 
research on this effect. In the DVN condition, the effect of pictures was eliminated, t(38) 
= -1.06,  p = .29, Cohen’s d = 0.34. BF = 0.23. Thus the presence of a DVN field 
eliminated distinctiveness-induced false memory reduction. Further analyses of simple 
main effects at each level of encoding condition showed that when pictures were present, 
the presence of DVN increased false memories to critical lures, t(38) = 4.67,  p ≤  .001, 
Cohen’s d =1.48. When pictures were absent, DVN had no effect, t(38) = -0.28, p = .78, 
Cohen’s d = 0.05, BF = 0.2. 
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In addition, the signal detection measure d’ was used to measure false memory. 
Using this measure, it is typical to treat yes responses to critical lures words from studied 
lists as “hits” and yes responses to critical lures from unstudied lists as false alarms and 
calculating d’ accordingly (e.g., Koutstaal & Schacter,  1997; Seamon, Lee, Toner, 
Wheeler, Goodkind, & Birch, 2002; Seamon, Luo, et al., 2002). Higher scores indicate 
greater false memory effects. These analyses indicated a marginal effect of noise 
condition, F(1, 76) = 3.04, p = .08, p

 = .03,  a significant effect of encoding condition 
F(1, 76) = 6.26, p = .001, p

 = .08, and a significant interaction, F(1, 76) = 4.30, p =  
.04, p

 = .06. These findings indicated a significant reduction in false memory when 
pictures were presented but only under SVN. This was confirmed by follow-up tests 
showing no difference under DVN conditions, t(38) = - 0.32, p = .75, Cohen’s d = 0.09 
BF = 0.3, but a significant difference under SVN, t(38) = - 3.08, p = .004, Cohen’s d = 
0.97, showing a higher d’ value (greater false memory to critical lures) in the absence of 
pictures. Consequently, the d’ value for false memory differed under SVN showing a 
lower false memory effect in the presence of pictures. In other words, DVN eliminated 
this difference. Further analyses of simple main effects at each level of encoding 
condition showed that when pictures were present, the presence of DVN increased false 
memories to critical lures, t(38) = 2.89,  p = .006, Cohen’s d = 0.91. When pictures were 
absent, DVN had no effect, t(38) = -0.22, p = .83, Cohen’s d = 0.07, BF = 0.42. Although 
the Bayes factor was above 0.3, it is clearly closer to evidence in support of the null 
hypothesis.   
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Analysis of response bias showed no significant effects; F(1, 76) = 0.002, p = .96, 
p

 < .001, for noise condition, F(1, 76) = 1.88, p =  .17, p

= .02, for encoding 
condition and F(1, 76) = 1.74, p = .19, p

 = .02, for the interaction. 
 The effects of encoding and noise condition on yes responses to critical lures and 
words from non-studied lists produced no effects, all p’s > .05.  
 
Remember/Know Responses. Remember, know and guess responses were 
analysed for each item type. The means (SDs) can be found in Table 2. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
For studied list words, no significant effects arose for remember, know or guess 
responses, all p’s > .05. For remember responses to critical lures, there was a significant 
effect of encoding condition, F(1, 76) = 8.60, p = .004, p

 = .10, with a greater 
proportion of remember responses when pictures were absent. There was no main effect 
of noise condition,  F(1, 76) = 1.38, p= .25, p

 = .01. However, the interaction was 
significant, F(1, 76) = 3.98, p = .05, p

 = .05. Subsequent analyses revealed a significant 
difference between the proportion of remember responses under SVN (t(38) = -3.34, p = 
.002, Cohen’s d = 1.07) but no difference under DVN  (t(38) = -0.69, p = .49, Cohen’s d 
= 0.22, BF = 0.21). This effect was brought about by DVN increasing the proportion of 
remember responses in the picture condition (t(38) = 2.36, p = .02, Cohen’s d = 0.77) but 
not in the picture absent condition (t(38) = -0.55, p = .58, Cohen’s d = 0.20).  
No significant effects were found on know responses; F(1, 76) = 0.56, p = .45, 
p

 = .007, for encoding condition, F(1, 76) = 2.70, p = .10, p

 = .03, for noise condition 
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and F(1, 76) = 0.02, p = .88, p

< . 001, for the interaction. For guess responses, only the 
main effect of encoding condition was significant, F(1, 76) = 6.67, p = .01, p

 = .08. For 
noise condition and the interaction the results were F(1, 76) = 0.06, p = .81, p

 = .001 
and F(1, 76) = 0.22, p = .64, p

= .003 respectively. 
The effects of encoding and noise condition on the remember and know responses 
to critical lures and words from non-studied lists produced no effects, all p’s > .05.  
 
Independence Process Based Estimates of Recollection & Familiarity. The results 
presented above made use of “raw” remember and know responses to estimate 
recollection and familiarity. Use of responses in this manner is based on the assumption 
of exclusivity (Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner, & Java, 1996; Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas 
& Jacoby, 1995). This assumption postulates that there is no overlap between recollection 
and familiarity processes. That is, a particular response to a test item reflects either 
recollection or familiarity but not both. Because of this, “raw” remember and know 
responses can be used to index recollection and familiarity respectively. However, the 
direct mapping of responses onto underlying processing is problematic if both processes 
act conjointly (in parallel) to facilitate performance. This idea is represented in certain 
dual-process theories of memory in which recollection and familiarity are independent of 
one another (Jacoby, 1991, 1998; Jacoby, Begg & Toth, 1997; Yonelinas, 2002; 
Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995; Yonelinas et al., 1998). Under the assumption of 
independence, both recollection and familiarity can work in parallel to influence overt 
behavioural performance. Consequently, remember and know responses cannot be taken 
as “process-pure” measurements of underlying cognitive processes. This is particularly 
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the case with process estimates of familiarity. With regard to familiarity, know responses 
may underestimate the real contribution of familiarity-based processes to recognition 
because participants only respond “know” when recollection fails. Algebraically, this can 
be represented as K = F(1 - R), where K equals the probability of  a know response, F 
represents familiarity and R represents recollection. To correct this, Yonelinas & Jacoby 
(1995) recommend calculating familiarity by rearranging the preceding formula. Thus a 
corrected measurement of familiarity is given by F = K/(1-R). The independence process 
estimate of recollection is less problematic and can be calculated by subtracting 
remember responses to non-studied items from remember responses to studied items 
(Yonelinas et al., 1998). Typically, across the literature, fewer differences are observed 
between the “raw” remember responses linked to process estimates of recollection 
compared to differences between “raw” know responses and process estimates of 
familiarity. In other words, the process estimates of familiarity are more dependent upon 
the statistical assumptions of independence (vs. exclusivity) compared to recollection. 
This is especially the case when the relevant false alarm rate is low. Consequently, 
process estimates of recollection are often very similar to those based on the actual 
proportion of remember responses. However, process estimates of familiarity can often 
diverge from the proportion of know responses. For the sake of completeness, process 
estimates of both recollection and familiarity are presented even though the former do not 
typically differ as function of the assumptions made. The means and SDs can be seen in 
Table 3. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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Process based analyses of recollection for studied list words indicated no 
significant effect of encoding condition, F(1, 76) = 0.49, p = .48, p

 = .006, no effect of 
noise, F(1, 76) = 0.32, p = .57, p

 = .004, and no interaction, F(1, 76) = 1.71, p = .20, 
p

= .02. Process based analyses of familiarity for studied list words indicated no 
significant effect of encoding condition, F(1, 76) = 0.06, p = .81, p

 = .001, no effect of 
noise, F(1, 76) = 1.37, p = .25, p

 = .01, and no interaction, F(1, 76) = 2.30, p = .13, p

 
= .02.    
Process based analyses of recollection for the critical lures were also calculated by 
treating critical words from studied lists as “hits” and critical words from non-studied 
lists as false alarms. This produced a significant effect of encoding condition, F(1, 76) = 
5.93,  p = .0.02, p

= .07, no effect of noise, F(1, 76) = 1.27, p = .26, p

 = .02, and a 
significant interaction, F(1, 76) = 4.32, p = .04, p

 = .054. Analyses of simple main 
effects revealed a significant difference between the recollection estimates between 
picture conditions under SVN (t(38) = -2.97, p = .005, Cohen’s d = 0.14) but no 
difference under DVN  (t(38) = -0.27, p = .78, Cohen’s d = 0.05, BF = 0.35). This effect 
was brought about by DVN increasing recollection estimates in the picture condition 
(t(38) = 2.41, p = .02, Cohen’s d = 0.74). No effect was found in the picture absent 
condition (t(38) = -0.64, p = .53, Cohen’s d = 0.20, BF = 0.71). 
Process based analyses of familiarity for the critical lures produced no effects of 
encoding condition, F(1, 76) = 0.45, p = .50, p

 = .006, no effect of noise, F(1, 76) = 
2.52, p = .17, p

 = .032, and no interaction, F(1, 76) = 0.01, p = .92, p

 = < .001. Thus 
overall, analysis of process based estimates revealed similar findings to the raw 
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proportion responses by showing an interaction between encoding and noise conditions 
for recollection estimates to critical lures.   
 
Discussion 
The results of the current experiment replicate previous research on the 
distinctiveness effect, in that the presence of pictures reduced false memory for critical 
lures. At the same time, the presence of pictures did not influence memory for studied 
words. The most important finding is that the distinctiveness-based reduction in false 
memory was only found under SVN conditions. In the presence of a DVN field, 
distinctiveness effects were not only reduced but eliminated. Analyses revealed that this 
arose due to the increase in false memory effects in the presence of DVN. In fact, the 
proportion of yes responses to critical lures was almost the same as in the absence of 
pictures.   
As the dynamic visual noise field was applied after encoding, the results cannot 
be dependent mechanisms involved in the initial reception, storage, or consolidation of 
that information. That DVN was applied during retrieval implicates retrieval or post-
retrieval monitoring processes.  In this case, the retrieval of pictures during testing 
provides a basis for the reduction of false memories through the application of post-
retrieval monitoring processes (Israel & Schacter, 1997). In the introduction, the 
distinctiveness heuristic was noted as an example of metacognitive monitoring processes 
subsumed under the class of retrieval evaluation (Gallo & Lampinen, 2015), or diagnostic 
monitoring (Gallo, 2010). With evaluative/diagnostic monitoring, the subject possesses 
expectations about the type of information to be retrieved and responds accordingly. 
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When distinctive pictorial information has been encoded, the subject develops 
expectancies in-line with this information. Accordingly, the application this heuristic 
provides a basis for evaluating the retrieved content for the presence/absence of relevant 
distinctive information that can be matched against the retrieval criteria (Gallo & 
Lampinen, 2015). As such, the ability to generate visual information from the encoding 
phase can provide clues as to the study status of the test item. In particular, absence (vs. 
presence) of pictorial information can serve as a basis for rejecting (vs. accepting) the 
item on the test.  
Consequently, the subject anticipates the retrieval of pictorial or visual 
information for studied information (Israel & Schacter, 1997; Schacter et al., 1999). As 
DVN (vs. SVN) increases the probability of false memories to word lists accompanied by 
pictorial information, then clearly dynamic visual noise in some way impacts upon the 
use of evaluative/diagnostic monitoring. Precisely how this is achieved requires further 
scrutiny. For example, it could be that subjects adopt alternative strategies for monitoring 
retrieved information and these are less useful or diagnostic for differentiating between 
studied and non-studied items. Alternatively, attempts to generate pictorial information 
could still continue, but simply fail in the face of interference. However, just because 
DVN is hypothesised to influence the diagnostic monitoring does not mean that DVN 
always acts in this manner. This will depend on the nature of the experimental task and 
retrieval demands. If other monitoring strategies are employed and these two invoke the 
generation of images, then memory performance should be expected to be influenced; 
this of course requires future work               
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Although the presence of pictures reduced false memory, at least under SVN 
conditions, they did not enhance retrieval of studied information. In other words, a 
picture superiority effect was not observed. This outcome is not unprecedented and 
previous experiments using the same paradigm have also found that the presence of 
pictures can dissociate true from false recognition (e.g., Budson, Droller, Dodson, 
Schacter, Rugg, Holcomb, & Daffner, 2005;  Schacter, Israel & Racine, 1999). This 
raises the question as to why the retrieval of visual-imagistic information was useful for 
reducing false memory but not for enhancing true memory. One explanation for this is 
that the recognition test was verbal and presented in the auditory modality (Israel & 
Schacter, 1997). Earlier research has indeed shown that the benefits of studying pictures 
(vs. words) are reduced in magnitude when tested with words; this has been observed 
both in terms of both accuracy and response time measures (e.g., Sternberg, Radeborg, & 
Hedman, 1995). However, important also for producing picture superiority effects are the 
surface features of the pictures themselves. For example, the largest gains in memory are 
produced by detailed photographs with smaller gains from black and white line drawings 
(Gollin & Sharps, 1998; Madigan & Lawrence, 1980; Ritchey 1982). The pictorial 
stimuli used in the current study were relatively simple black and white line drawings; 
this may have been sufficient to reduce false memory but insufficient to enhance true 
memory. Perhaps greater effects on studied items would have been observed if more 
detailed pictures had been used. Essentially, such conditions as outlined above may serve 
to minimise the influence of pictorial information for studied items.    
The use of the remember/know procedure also revealed some interesting findings. 
In particular, under SVN, the presence of pictorial information reduced the proportion of 
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false remember responses and process-based estimates of false recollection. One 
explanation of this is that participants were able to use the absence of pictorial or visual-
imagery information in order to avoid false recollections. Thus, in the absence of 
distinctive visual memories, a false remember response is much less likely to be given. 
False remember responses in the picture absent condition, could be related to the 
conscious activation of the critical lure or specific information linked to the associates 
that were presented during encoding (Lampinen, Meier, Arnal, & Leding, 2005; Roediger 
& McDermott, 1995).  
When pictures had been studied, viewing the DVN field during retrieval, led to an 
increase in false remember responses and false recollection. Presumably, the presence of 
DVN reduced the effective generation of visual-imagery and the use of the 
distinctiveness heuristic. Consequently, the absence of imagery related information could 
not be employed to reduce false remembering. Instead, false remember responses under 
the DVN condition may be based upon similar processes that create such memories in the 
absence of pictures during encoding. That is, subjects may have based false remember 
responses on the encoding based activation of non-visual associative or lexical 
information.         
Demonstrating an effect of DVN on false memory for critical lures provides some 
theoretical leverage on the nature in which pictorial information is represented or used to 
bring about false memory reduction. In particular, Quinn and McConnell (2006) theorize 
a distinction between a passive visual store, or visual buffer, and a long-term pattern 
activation system (e.g., Kosslyn, 1980, 1994). The pattern activation system is an 
associative memory store that comprises of abstract information (including visual codes) 
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stored in long-term memory. By this account, the information stored in the pattern 
activation system is not the visual image as such. Rather, this system contains the 
required details needed to recreate the conscious visual image; this representation has 
been called the “compressed” visual image by Kosslyn (1994).  
Others have also theorized a distinction between the visual buffer and other 
components of a working memory system; in particular, the visual cache (Logie, 1995; 
2011). The visual cache serves the function of maintaining, over short periods, visual 
information derived either from perception or long-term stores. The contents of the visual 
cache are temporary representations of a more abstract nature produced after visual 
mental images have been generated or following a perceptual episode.  
Neither the pattern activation system nor the visual cache directly supports visual 
mental imagery. The visual buffer however, is considered to generate and support the 
processing of conscious visual imagery. Across various accounts, the long/short-term 
storage and maintenance of visual information and the generation of conscious visual 
images are considered to be supported by different cognitive components that give rise to 
the dissociations observed between various visual memory and imagery tasks (Borst, 
Niven & Logie, 2012; Logie & Van der Meulen; 2009). For example, although DVN 
typically reduces performance in tasks requiring the generation of visual mental images, 
(e.g., Quinn & McConnell, 2006), it does not consistently impair performance on tasks of 
visual short-term memory (e.g., Andrade, Kemps, Werniers, May, & Szmalec, 2002)
2
.   
From these proposals, pictorial distinctiveness could be hypothesized to reduce 
false memory because of either (i) the activation of abstract visual information from the 
pattern activation store/visual cache or, (ii) the generation of conscious visual imagery in 
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the visual buffer. However, because only the later is susceptible to disruption by DVN 
(Quinn & McConnell, 2006), then the conclusion that distinctiveness effects in false 
memory operate by attempts to retrieve visual-imagistic information appears to be 
warranted. This account suggests that distinctiveness-based false memory reduction 
arises when relevant imagistic information is retrieved or generated into the visual buffer. 
When this is prevented, for example by the use of a DVN field, then the generation of 
imagistic information is disrupted and false memories are increased.  
In the context of the above, a distinction has often been made between generation 
and maintenance processes. Here, generation refers to the creation of images, and 
maintenance refers to the retention of that information over a time period such as a delay. 
With regard to visual imagery, it has typically been found that DVN disrupts performance 
only when applied during the generation stage at encoding or retrieval. When applied 
during a delay period, over which the same imagery information must be maintained, no 
effects of DVN are observed.  Consequently, it could be argued that DVN is disrupting 
the actual generation rather than the maintenance of images; with the latter being 
consigned to long-term memory or the visual cache depending on the nature of the delay, 
stimulus and task (Logie and Van der Meulen; 2009). In spite of this claim, the visual 
buffer must clearly maintain imagery information over some period of time in order for it 
to be of use when performing various cognitive tasks that demand the use of imagery 
(Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn et al., 2006). Thus the question arises as to whether DVN can 
disrupt visual imagery once this has been generated, and subsequently impair 
performance. Unfortunately, this question cannot be answered from the results of the 
current study as the DVN field was present throughout the retrieval period. Instead  DVN 
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would need to be applied at various stages during the retrieval process such as prior to, or 
just after imagery has been generated. As applied to distinctiveness effects in false 
memory, this awaits further research.         
 The results of current study are interesting when considered within a broader 
perspective of research using electrophysiological recording techniques and 
neuroimaging. For example, Budson, et al., (2005), used event-related potentials (ERPs) 
to assess the impact of pictorial information on false memory. They found that for 
subjects who studied pictures (vs. words), a parietal based ERP component differentiated 
between studied and non-studied items from about 550 ms to 1000 ms. This was 
explained as arising from attempts to use the distinctiveness heuristic via attempts to 
recover pictorial information in order to discriminate between types of item on the 
recognition test (Budson et al., 2005).        
 Ganis, Thompson & Kosslyn (2004) argue visual imagery and perception share 
not only many cognitive features in common but also a great deal of overlap in their 
respective neural substrates. In some neuroimaging studies, over 90% of the activated 
voxels are shared between perception and imagery (Ganis et al., 2004). This is to be 
expected if similar processing mechanisms operate during both imagery and perception. 
These areas include the visual sensory regions such as the striate (area 17) and 
pre/extrastriate cortices (such as area 18) (Klein et al., 2004; Kosslyn, DiGirolamo, 
Thompson, & Alpert,  1998;  Kosslyn, & Thompson, 2003; Thiron et al., 2006). At a 
more general level, it has been concluded that imagery tasks often lead to patterns of 
brain activity similar (although not always identical) to those during perception (Zimmer, 
2008). Similarities observed earlier in the processing stream become more pronounced 
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further down as the processing hierarchy is ascended (Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes & 
Kosslyn, 2015).   Other neuroimaging work has revealed that recollection from long-term 
memory of the visual details from a study episode can lead to the reactivation of visual 
regions that were originally activated during encoding (e.g., Stokes, Thompson, Cusack, 
& Duncan, 2009; Wheeler, Peterson, & Buckner, 2000) and that these regions show 
differences between true and false memory (Slotnick & Schacter, 2004; Stark, Okado, & 
Loftus, 2010). Again, this should not be taken to indicate complete overlap between 
visual perception and visual retrieval, because sensory cortex activations are larger in 
magnitude during perception with increased involvement of frontal regions during 
retrieval (e.g., Lee, Kravitz, & Baker, 2013; Ranganath & Paller, 1999; Ranganath, 
Johnson, & D’Esposito, 2000; Stark, Okado, & Loftus, 2010). The visual buffer has been 
linked to the early visual processing stream (Kosslyn, & Thompson, 2003) indicating that 
these areas are of particular importance when the interface between perception, memory 
and imagery are considered. To date, we are not aware of any research that has directly 
examined the neural basis of DVN effects. However, neuroimaging studies that have 
made use of similar visual stimuli (flashing or alternating checkerboard patterns) show 
increased activity in areas 17 and 18 or the visual buffer (Huettel & McCarthy, 2000; 
Shigihara, Hoshi, & Zeki, 2016). In addition, processing in some of these sensory regions 
that are activated during imagery and visual retrieval can be selectively disrupted by 
external interference such as distraction brought about by the presentation of irrelevant 
visual input in the form of pictures (Clapp, Rubens, & Gazzaley, 2010; Wais, Rubens, 
Boccanfuso, & Gazzaley, 2010). Therefore perhaps such interference is acting at the level 
of the visual buffer. If so, then it could be argued that these regions are those disrupted by 
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DVN and thus play a role in attempts to retrieve pictorial details to reduce false memory. 
Further research will play a valuable role in clarifying the conditions in which visual 
imagery is used during memory and the mechanisms that underpin its usage.   
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Footnotes 
1. The explanation of the effects of pictorial information on memory in this paper is 
based on the role of post-retrieval processing. This is not to discount effects that 
may result from disrupted encoding processes. For example, the presentation of 
pictures may demand additional processing resources that disrupt the encoding of 
relational information between words (e.g., Hege & Dodson, 2004). This notion 
could also apply to other instances in which attentionally demanding tasks reduce 
the processing of relational information. However, although this may occur to 
some extent, it does not fully explain the differences found by comparison of 
between and within-subject designs in which picture effects are found only for 
between-subject designs.  
2. There are some exceptions to this in which DVN has been shown to impair the 
short-term retention of color or texture (e.g., Dean et al., 2008; Dent, 2010). 
Typically however, DVN does not interfere with the short-term retention of 
structured visual stimuli such as matrices.   
3. The reported and analysed values are for the log-transformed scores. This is 
because of a slight positive skew for the β scores for true memory. The analyses 
for the raw scores did not alter the pattern of results nor the conclusions drawn 
from these results. The β scores for false memory showed less skew, but the log-
transformed scores are shown and presented for the purpose of direct comparison. 
Once more, the pattern of results was not altered when the raw scores were used.   
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TABLE 1 
Mean proportion (and SD) of hits, false alarms, & signal detection measures as a function of interference 
condition, item type  and picture condition. 
 
      Interference Condition 
 
 
 Item Type    Static           Dynamic 
 & Picture Condition     
 
  
Hits 
  Picture   0.73 (0.13)  0.78 (0.12) 
  No Picture  0.78 (0.09)  0.80 (0.10) 
 
   
False Alarms (Critical Lure from Presented Lists) 
 
Picture   0.35 (0.16)  0.56 (0.12) 
  No Picture  0.59 (0.22)  0.61 (0.17) 
 
False Alarms (Critical Lure from Non Presented Lists) 
 
Picture   0.11 (0.10)  0.14 (0.17) 
  No Picture  0.15 (0.21)  0.16 (0.09) 
 
False Alarms (Words from Non Presented Lists) 
 
Picture   0.12 (0.13)  0.14 (0.10) 
  No Picture  0.17 (0.15)  0.18 (0.10) 
 
 
 Signal Detection True Memory 
 
d’ 
Picture   2.00 (0.59)  2.03 (0.57) 
  No Picture  1.91 (0.63)  1.90 (0.62) 
 Log β 
Picture   0.31 (0.35)  1.15 (0.38)  
  No Picture  0.21 (0.36)  0.06 (0.27) 
 
Signal Detection False Memory 
 
d’ 
Picture   0.79 (0.48)  1.30 (0.61) 
  No Picture  1.40 (0.74)  1.35 (0.50) 
 Log β 
Picture   0.27 (0.19)  0.33 (0.24)  
  No Picture  0.26 (0.26)  0.19 (0.18) 
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TABLE 2 
Mean proportion (and SD) of remember, know & guess responses as function of interference condition, 
item type and picture condition. 
 
      Interference Condition 
 
 Item Type    Static           Dynamic 
 & Picture Condition     
  
 Studied Words from Presented Lists 
 
 Remember   
  Picture   0.56 (0.18)  0.54 (0.15) 
  No Picture  0.51 (0.14)  0.60 (0.16) 
Know 
Picture   0.13 (0.10)  0.19 (0.11) 
No Picture  0.19 (0.12)  0.16 (0.16) 
 Guess 
  Picture   0.04 (0.07)  0.05 (0.09) 
  No Picture  0.08 (0.10)  0.05 (0.07) 
  
 Critical Lure from Presented Lists 
 
Remember   
  Picture   0.14 (0.17)  0.28 (0.19) 
  No Picture  0.36 (0.22)  0.32 (0.17) 
Know 
Picture   0.18 (0.13)  0.24 (0.14) 
No Picture  0.16 (0.18)  0.21 (0.15) 
 Guess 
  Picture   0.03 (0.06)  0.04 (0.09) 
  No picture  0.09 (0.11)  0.09 (0.10) 
 
Critical Lure from Non Presented Lists 
 
Remember   
  Picture   0.02 (0.04)  0.02 (0.05) 
  No Picture  0.04 (0.07)  0.04 (0.05) 
Know 
Picture   0.05 (0.06)  0.08 (0.13) 
No Picture  0.06 (0.09)  0.08 (0.09) 
 Guess 
  Picture   0.05 (0.08)  0.05 (0.10) 
  No Picture  0.05 (0.14)  0.04 (0.07) 
 
Words from Non Presented Lists 
 
Remember   
  Picture   0.01 (0.02)  0.02 (0.03) 
  No Picture  0.03 (0.04)  0.05 (0.07) 
Know 
Picture   0.05 (0.07)  0.08 (0.09) 
No Picture  0.08 (0.08)  0.08 (0.08) 
 Guess 
  Picture   0.06 (0.09)  0.05 (0.07) 
  No Picture  0.05 (0.09)  0.06 (0.07) 
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TABLE 3 
Mean proportion (and SD) of independence process based estimates of recollection and familiarity as a 
function of interference condition and word type and picture condition. 
 
      Interference Condition 
 
 
 Item Type    Static           Dynamic 
 & Picture Condition     
 
  
 Studied Words from Presented Lists 
 
 Recollection   
  Picture   0.55 (0.19)  0.53 (0.16) 
  No Picture  0.48 (0.13)  0.55 (0.18) 
Familiarity 
Picture   0.28 (0.18)  0.40 (0.20) 
No Picture  0.36 (0.17)  0.34 (0.26) 
  
  
 Critical Lure from Presented Lists 
 
Recollection   
  Picture   0.13 (0.18)  0.27 (0.18) 
  No Picture  0.32 (0.23)  0.28 (0.17) 
Familiarity 
Picture   0.18 (0.14)  0.23 (0.14) 
No Picture  0.16 (0.18)  0.21 (0.16) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
